BARBAROSSA

- HITLER'S INVASION OF RUSSIA AND ADVANCE ON MOSCOW

From September 1939 until June 1941, the Second World War was, like the First, essentially a European war. Unlike the Great War of 1914-18, it was also a war founded on opposing concepts of politics, moral values and even religious outlook. The armies of both sides were not just patriotic and willing - they fought with a strong moral conviction.

Since 1924, when he dictated Mein Kampf to Rudolf Hess while imprisoned at Landsberg Prison, Hitler had made no secret of his loathing of Communism, and of his wish to annihilate the "Bolshevik Jews". By 1937, the principle of Lebensraum , of finding new "living space" to the East, was well established in Nazi philosophy, and it was generally assumed that this implied a threat to Soviet Russia - hence Churchill's reference to the signing of the Non-aggression Pact between Russia and Germany on August 23rd 1939 as "this unnatural act". The Pact seemed to indicate an uncharacteristic change of heart by Hitler - and yet it is clear that, when Britain was on the verge of defeat in 1940, Hitler hoped for an alliance with Britain against the Bolsheviks. As early as July 29th 1940, Colonel-General Alfred Jodl, chief of Operations, had announced to an assembly of staff officers that Hitler had decided to attack the USSR in the spring of 1941. On July 31st, Hitler himself said at a briefing "Wiping out the very power to exist of Russia! That is the goal!"

The simple truth was that the Non-Aggression Pact was no more than a device to buy time to defeat the Western democracies before turning East. It had always been Hitler's intention to attack Russia once all in the West had gone to plan. Now, in the summer of 1941, the whole of continental Europe with the exception of the neutrals (Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal) was either occupied or ceded to a puppet government - as was the case with Vichy France. Only Britain remained undefeated.

It seems likely that Hitler greatly underestimated both Britain's ability to recover from the military defeats she had suffered, and the extent to which the USA, even as a neutral, was prepared to supply arms and munitions. He also miscalculated totally the likelihood of the USA entering the war as a combatant, largely because his Japanese allies were not prepared to brief him in advance on their intentions.

Certainly, Hitler thought, at the end of 1940, when his Directive No. 21 - Barbarossa - was issued to the High Command, that he could expect to remain in control of the war despite opening a new front, that the British were now largely a spent force, and that there was no reason to expect an expansion of the geographical compass of the war beyond his own attack on his allies in Russia.

In fact, as we now know, 1941 was the year when the essentially European nature of the Second World War evaporated, and it became a genuinely worldwide conflict. The year was to see Asia, America and Africa plunged into war, and the first signs of the Axis being pointed inexorably towards defeat. It was also the year when much wider polarisation of beliefs and cultures entered into the conflict; the Communist versus the Fascist; the Oriental opposing the Occidental.

At the beginning of the year Hitler was at the pinnacle of his power; the architect of the greatest conquest the world had ever known; personally responsible for strategic decisions that his generals had said would be disastrous, and which had instead been outstandingly successful. When he said that Russia would be taken by Autumn 1941, there was, although logic was not on the side of his assertion, little reason for disbelieving him.

Yet, despite Hitler's long stated hatred of Bolshevism, Josef Stalin showed no sign of apprehension. Stalin had on May 7th 1941 added to his Secretaryship of the Communist Party of the USSR the Chairmanship of the Council of People's Commissars, a job he took over from Molotov, and evidently had no inkling of the likelihood of attack by Germany, then only six weeks ahead. Winston Churchill recalled in his The Second World War that intelligence reports from the Balkans and Germany had convinced him by March 1941 that Hitler intended to attack Russia, and that by May he was certain of it. Churchill tried, with a short, sharp telegram, to warn Stalin, but the Kremlin responded with a communique dictated to Tass , the Russian News Agency, accusing Britain of spreading ugly rumours about Germany, and doing everything possible to appease Hitler. Stalin did not wish to be confused with facts, an act of stubborness that was to cost the USSR a large part of the Soviet Air Force, destroyed on the ground in the first wave of the attack.

Thus, when the fateful day of Barbarossa dawned, the Soviet armed forces were prepared neither for the fury of the treacherous attack launched upon them, nor for the barbarity of the treatment meted out by the German forces to Russian civilians and prisoners of war on the direct orders of Hitler, who instructed his armies to regard their Russian enemy as less than human. The assault brought into conflict 3,400,000 Germans and 4,700,000 Russian troops. The sheer scale both of the armies involved, and of their appalling losses, has no equal in any war in history.

Barbarossa began at 3.15am on that June morning along a front of no less than 2,900 kilometres, from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Into the attack went 153 divisions of the 208 that Germany had available, 120 of the 153 being thrown into the actual assault, the remainder being held in reserve. There were 29 Panzer and motorised divisions, with a total of 3,090 tanks. Four air fleets of the Luftwaffe were deployed on the new Eastern Front, bringing with them 1,945 aircraft.

By comparison, the Red Army, still unconcernedly engaged upon its summer manoeuvres when the blow fell, was sadly inadequate. Stalin had, since 1937, remorselessly "eliminated" any major military figure who showed initiative, disagreed with his policies or attempted to wield influence. He had thus encouraged mediocrity, and brought to high command mainly incompetent sycophants who knew little other than when to keep their mouths shut. There were exceptions, whose names ring forth from the history of the Russian War - notably Malinovsky, Konev and Zhukov. But, in the opening weeks of the campaign, the military ineptitude of the majority of the Russian High Command killed almost as many Russian soldiers as did the fighting proficiency of the Wehrmacht .

Numerically, the Russian forces were not at any severe disadvantage. In terms of training, equipment, and, above all, quality of military leadership, they were no match for the might of the world's most experienced and efficient fighting machine. Only in July 1940 had previous resistance to the use of large scale tank formations been reversed, and mechanised and armoured divisions been formed. Many of the inexperienced tank units were annihilated during the first few weeks of the campaign, and only those equipped with the new T-34 medium tank, and the KV-2 and T-35 heavy tanks were able to give the Germans any show of real resistance. These tanks were, in fact, the strongest features of the Soviet military profile - they were actually better than anything the Germans could put in the field. The T-34 in particular has been likened to Britain's Spitfire fighter in its importance to Allied success against Germany. With its 33 mph speed, 7.62cm gun, low fire risk from its 500 hp diesel engine and cleverly shaped armour that was impenetrable to current German anti-tank weapons, the T-34 tank was to remain a major problem to the German army throughout the campaign and the war - but, although 1,225 had been produced by the time Barbarossa began, the T-34 was not actually fielded against the German armies until they reached Smolensk. On the debit side of the account was the fact that, in June 1941, only 29 per cent of Russia's tanks were in a fit condition to fight. Incompetent organisation had ensured that spares for the older tanks were in short supply and that maintenance had been inadequate.

The tremendous speed with which the German armour advanced into Russia is not therefore as remarkable as it first seems. By the evening of the first day, Colonel-General Guderian's Panzer divisions in the "Army Group Centre" area had reached Kobrin and Pruzhany, almost 50 miles into Russia. Colonel-General Hoth's Panzer divisions were 59 miles from their starting point, and had taken the bridges over the important River Niemen intact. In the North, Field-Marshal von Leeb's Panzergruppe IV under Colonel-General Hoeppner had also progressed 50 <SW2>miles and had successfully taken the viaduct across the Doubissa gorges at Airogala.

Successful German bombing raids had destroyed a large proportion of the Soviet Air Force on the ground during the first hour of Barbarossa, and those that were left gave the Luftwaffe little trouble. Field-Marshal Albert Kesselring, commanding the Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front, reported that the Russian pilots were "innocents to the slaughter", and his pilots had an easy campaign in the early stages, despite the Russians having 3,000 aircraft in the frontier regions on the day before Barbarossa began. The success of the initial bombing raids destroyed some 2,500 aircraft, and many more were shot down in combat on the first day. By June 23rd, resistance in the air was minimal.

Because Russian communications were almost non-existent, the High Command had no means of appreciating what was happening in such a modern, high-speed war. Their already inadequate grasp of tactics was rendered utterly useless by this lack of effective radio. Thus each Russian commander was taking separate, independent and often conflicting decisions against an enemy that was under the total and effective control of its High Command. Inevitably, gaps in the defensive line opened of their own accord for the Germans to sweep through; vital positions, bridges, installations were not destroyed before the Russians were forced to retreat.

The lightning advance continued. By June 25th, Guderian had reached Baranovichi, and Hoth was in Molodechno. The next day, the two Panzergruppen made contact and pushed on to Minsk, where, on the 29th they closed with a pincer movement behind the unfortunate defenders. By July 8th, General Halder was noting in his diary that 32 of the 43 divisions of the Soviet 3rd, 4th and 10th armies had been virtually annihilated. The Germans had taken nearly 290,000 prisoners; captured 2,585 tanks, 1,449 guns, 246 aircraft.

July 11th saw the German armour cross the Dnieper, and Army Group South approaching Kiev. Not until mid-July, when a second pincer movement by Panzergruppen 2 and 3 brought massive forces to bear at Smolensk, did the Germans encounter any really successful resistance. The Russians trapped by the pincer fought furiously and well to break out, while, from the outside, Marshal Timoshenko and Lieutenant-General Eremenko fought hard to break in and relieve the besieged army. The battle went on until August 8th, when Marshal Timoshenko was defeated at Roslavl. Guderian took 38,000 prisoners, 300 tanks and 300 guns. Almost immediately, Smolensk fell, and German Army High Command (OKH) announced the taking of 310,000 prisoners, the capture or destruction of over 3,000 armoured vehicles, and 3,000 artillery pieces.

German armour at Elnia was now only 200 miles from Moscow. German casualties at August 13th had reached, since the beginning of the campaign, 389,924 officers and men, of whom 98,600 were killed or missing. Compare that with comparable German figures for the whole war to May 31st 1941 - 218,109 casualties, of whom 97,000 were killed. It had been a devastating seven weeks for the cream of German manhood, as well as for Russia. The pace of the advance, the appalling roads and rough country conditions, and the abrasive dust were having a serious effect on the mechanical condition of the German armour. Try as they might, the Germans were slowing down.

Now Hitler took a personal hand in the campaign in his role as military tactician, a pursuit for which he was fast proving himself manifestly unsuited. His Directive No. 34 of August 12th 1941 changed the whole strategic plan of Barbarossa by insisting on what he saw as a tactical move to take Leningrad and the North, plus the Crimea and the Donets coal and industrial basin before winter. In vain did Field Marshal Brauchitsch, and Generals Halder and Guderian express their belief that the army should continue its advance and take Moscow. Hitler was adamant. As usual, the Generals bowed to his will. From that time on, the campaign in Russia was doomed. Not one but two factors brought about the change of fortune. Barbarossa had been scheduled originally for May 1941, but Hitler had postponed it for more than a month because of the Balkan campaign. Even then Brauchitsch had predicted disaster in Russia when winter came. Now, Hitler's diversion of the attack wasted more of the vital summer weather.

But the effect was not immediate. In late August, Field-Marshal von Rundstedt's 11th, 17th and 6th Armies established four bridgeheads on the left bank of the Dnieper and on September 11th, Kleist linked up with Guderian at Kremenchug. In the South, Marshal Budenny requested permission to evacuate the Kiev pocket. Stalin rejected his request. By the 17th, when the armies were at last given permission to withdraw, they were encircled and could go nowhere. On the 18th, Kiev fell, and the commander, General Kirponos, was killed. Vast numbers of men and machines were captured. The numbers are still the subject of dispute, but it is reasonably certain that over half a million men, more than 750 tanks and some 3,500 guns were captured. By the end of September, Russian losses since June amounted to 2,500,000 men, 22,000 guns, 18,000 tanks and 14,000 aircraft.

In the north, Leeb's Army Group North had reached the shores of Lake Ladoga, east of Leningrad, on September 8th, and had begun the siege that was intended to realise Hitler's intention of taking Leningrad for the winter. To the West of their positions, Marshal Mannerheim's Finns were recapturing the positions they had lost in the Winter War of 1940, and were in control of the Karelian Isthmus, but refused to assist Germany in the expected final assault on Leningrad. On September 11th, Stalin moved General Zhukov to take over the defence of Leningrad from the inscrutably mediocre Marshal Voroshilov, and, not for the last time, Zhukov pulled a garrison together, regenerated the Russians' morale and self discipline, and began the erection of stronger defences. By the 16th September, Hitler had ordered a major artillery and Luftwaffe bombing offensive against Leningrad and the nearby naval base in Kronstadt harbour, and over the next few days one Russian battleship was sunk, and 2 battleships and 2 cruisers were seriously damaged at Kronstadt.

By the 30th September, the siege of Leningrad had claimed 4,409 civilian lives, an appalling death toll resulting from 200 artillery bombardments and 23 air raids in one month. Still the city did not surrender. As winter closed in famine gripped the city, and the citizens of Leningrad ate their pets, their wallpaper, their hair oil - anything that promised to sustain life. Not until January 1943 were the Russians able to open a rail link to the city, and not until January 1944 did the German bombing and shelling of the city finally stop. More than a million civilians died in what must surely be the most vicious siege in history. But they never surrendered.

As the German advance in the other sectors slowed, the Red Army began, despite its losses, to regroup, and to reassemble artillery, rockets and new infantry weapons. Belated reorganisation of the command structure began, and some semblance of morale and resurgent military discipline gave the Russian troops new heart. During the first two weeks of October, a massive offensive was launched by the Germans to take Moscow, and by October 20th, Bock was within forty miles of the capital. A massive evacuation of the government, foreign diplomats and much of the civilian population was under way; only Stalin and his military command remained in the Kremlin. On the night of October 14th-15th, it seemed to the Russian defenders that the crunch had come, as German armour attacked with great force, breaking through the perimeter of Moscow at one point, and coming within sight of Moscow's famous Khimke water tower.

At this crucial moment, Stalin replaced Timoshenko with Zhukov, who had revitalised the defence of Leningrad. An able tactician, Zhukov recognised the German army's vulnerability to the cruel Russian winter, and contented himself with holding the line until the snow, which was already falling, took hold and bogged down the Wehrmacht in a misery of perpetual wet boots and temperatures far below zero. As the snow alternated with torrential rain, the German army became virtually immoveable. Judging his moment to a nicety, Zhukov chose December 6th to go on to the offensive. From now on, the Germans would never again be truly in the ascendant on the Eastern Front.

The Russians Fight Back

Throughout the great German offensive into Russia, the Wehrmacht had seemed invincible; better equipped, infinitely better led, better trained, more experienced in every field of conflict. But that was in summer and autumn. So confident had Hitler been that his mighty army would subdue Russia by October, that millions of German soldiers and airmen had gone to the East Front with only summer kit. Now, in December, the temperature fell to twenty, sometimes more than thirty, degrees below zero. With little shelter, inadequate food and nil achievement since winter came, the morale of the Wehrmacht sank lower than ever before.

By contrast, the Red Army had regrouped, using the comparative lull in the campaign to bring up artillery, armour and reserve manpower. The coming of Zhukov had an effect on the defenders of beleaguered Moscow not unlike that later to be seen when General Montgomery took command of the British Eighth Army - morale was boosted for no very logical or explicable reason other than the sheer magnetism of the commander and the respect his troops held for him. Above all, the Russian soldiers were properly equipped with warm quilted winter coats, waterproof boots and clothing designed to minimise wind chill.

German morale was not helped by Hitler's adamant refusal to permit tactical withdrawal. Hitler ordered that not an inch of ground be given. His commanders were bitter about this decision, believing that tens of thousands of German lives might have been saved if a limited withdrawal to positions affording some shelter had been permitted. Ultimately, this decision was to prove one of the principal reasons for the failure of Hitler's Russian campaign. Frozen almost, and in some cases actually, to death, his troops were no match physically or mentally for the counteroffensive when it came. And come it did, on December 6th.

Initially, the ferocious onslaught of Zhukov's offensive set the German army reeling, although it fought bravely, as always, and just managed to hold its line. The Russians were now, entirely unexpectedly to the Germans, able to field 160 Divisions against Bock's 68, and were to go on to reinforce their strength with a further 60 divisions in the first six months of 1942. Production of the new tanks was now outstripping the rate at which the Germans were able to destroy them, and by the time the Battle of Moscow began, 1,853 T-34 tanks had been delivered to the Red Army. On December 20th, aware that without the opportunity to make a tactical withdrawal, eventual defeat was certain, Colonel-General Guderian left for Hitler's Eastern headquarters at Rastenburg, in East Prussia, to try and obtain the Fuehrer's agreement to a retreat. No permission was forthcoming. Hitler insisted on an attack that was manifestly beyond the army's capability.

Now, at what was already their worst hour, the Germans began to suffer an appalling loss of experienced commanders. On the 16th December, Field-Marshal von Bock asked to resign - a decision made necessary by a combination of ill-health and inability to agree with Hitler - and was succeeded by Kluge. On December 19th, Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch, who had had a heart attack in November, left the Army High Command (OKH), and Hitler took the opportunity of assuming his role as Commander in Chief of the Army. Then, on December 26th, Guderian was relieved of his command, being replaced by General Schmidt, and, at the beginning of January, Colonel-General Hoeppner was disgraced for ordering the 4th Panzerarmee to disengage, and was replaced by Colonel-General Hoth. On January 18th, Field-Marshal von Reichenau suddenly died - and Bock was brought back to active service against his wishes, with the luckless General Paulus being ordered to take over the Sixth Army. In the North, Field-Marshal von Leeb requested permission to retire, and was replaced as commander of Army Group North by Colonel-General von Kuchler.

To stiffen the German line, which at the beginning of 1942 showed every sign of breaking, Hitler began to bring in 22 infantry divisions from France and Germany in the first three months of 1942, but the Russians forestalled their arrival with further orders to Generals Konev and Zhukov, commanding the Kalinin and West Fronts, to attack and annihilate German Army Group Centre, which had so recently expected to celebrate Christmas in Red Square.

Thus began, on January 9th and 10th 1942, the offensive that was to lead to the appalling defeat of Stalingrad, and ultimately to the subjugation of Eastern Europe. The Bear had awakened.