MONTGOMERY AND THE DESERT FOX

ALAMEIN AND THE ALLIED RECOVERY

We left the British Eighth Army and Rommel's much-depleted Panzerarmee Africa in mid-July 1942 facing each other at El Alamein, 60 miles from Alexandria. Rommel was badly overstretched; short of men, supplies, equipment and fuel. The Eighth Army had been severely demoralised by Rommel's lightning advance after the fall of Tobruk in June, had been heartened by their comparative success in the first Battle of Alamein, and now awaited badly needed reinforcements and some more positive leadership than that provided thus far by General Auchinleck and Lieutenant-General Ritchie.

On hearing of the fall of Tobruk, President Roosevelt and General Marshall had arranged, almost without asking Churchill, to re-equip the Eighth Army with the new 30 ton M4 Sherman tank, whose superior turret, 75mm gun and greater off-road speed than the M3 Grant made it approximately the equal of the German PzKpfw IV. The USA also supplied 100 self-propelled guns, and the combination of the American guns and tanks potentially changed the balance of power in North Africa. But the most potent of weapons is inadequate without the inspiration of great commanders, and Churchill, impetuous as always, yet understanding of the psychological need of an army to taste success, grew increasingly impatient of Auchlinleck's failure to capitalise on his recent success against Rommel's attempt to push on to Egypt.

Anglo-American planning was already well-advanced for Operation Torch, the Allied landings in French North Africa, scheduled for November 1942, and General Sir Harold Alexander had been appointed as General Eisenhower's deputy for that operation, in command of the British 1st Army.

Churchill decided, at the beginning of August 1942, to see for himself the Eighth Army, its command structure and the position in which it found itself, and on August 4th arrived in Cairo. He found that the Cairo GHQ favoured a wait at least until September for an attack on Rommel's positions, in order to assemble reinforcements, regroup and plan its offensive. He was not pleased, and on August 6th asked the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir Alan Brooke (later Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke) to assume command in the Middle East, with General Auchinleck taking only the Iraq and Iran theatres. Brooke felt that he was of more service in his existing role, and tactfully refused, whereupon Churchill asked the Americans to accept that General Alexander be released from his responsibilities to Operation Torch to take over in the Western Desert. For the command of the Eighth Army, Alexander and Churchill initially selected Lieutenant-General W.H.E. Gott, but he was killed in an air crash days afterwards. Their choice then fell on General Bernard Law Montgomery, who had been intended as Alexander's replacement as commander of the British 1st Army for "Torch", and now moved to the desert, leaving Eisenhower wondering why Churchill kept taking his deputies away from him. The arrival of Montgomery in Cairo was historic. Arrogant, less than totally lovable, yet an inspiration to all who served with and under him, he was destined to become one of the best known figures of the Second World War. His was the fire that was to drive the Eighth Army forward and the Afrika Korps back, not only to Rommel's starting point, but far beyond to Tripoli, in less than a year.

There was much to do. Montgomery launched himself upon the task of strengthening the defences of the El Alamein position and, knowing that the Panzerarmee Afrika was now heavily reinforced, made the assumption that it could not be long before Rommel attacked. The presence and virtual impassability of the Qattara depression, the height of the Alam el Halfa ridge, and the proximity of the sea made it unlikely that Rommel could execute one of the outflanking manoeuvres that he had made peculiarly his own. Montgomery therefore decided that Rommel would attack where he was least expected, and would try to "tease" out the tanks of the Eighth Army to be destroyed by the superior German anti-tank guns. Acting on this hunch, the British commander ordered the 44th Division and two brigades of the 10th Armoured to reinforce the defences of the Alam el Halfa ridge, and ordered the tanks to dig in and act defensively rather than adopt a mobile offensive role.

The German attack expected at full moon on August 26th did not materialise. The British generals (Horrocks and de Guingand), under Montgomery's direction, used the interlude to indulge in a little deception which had almost the qualities of comic opera, but which was nonetheless effective in misleading the Germans and giving the British army the edge in the battle that followed. They produced a map which gave a highly inaccurate yet detailed picture of the Allied minefields and the natural hazards of the desert, and then arranged for it to be abandoned after an armoured car "broke down" in no man's land. The Germans took the bait. When the attack finally came in the early hours of August 31st, the progress of the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions was slow; they were hampered by unexpected minefields and by an enemy who seemed to know exactly where to shell and attack from the air. In the melee, the commanders of both Panzer Divisions were put out of the action - Major-General von Bismarck of the 21st, killed by a mine, and Lieutenant-General Nehring of the 15th, severely injured by air attack.

Air power and a defensive use of artillery were, in fact, the deciding factors in the Battle of Alam el Halfa. The Germans and Italians were repulsed at every turn, and were losing men and armour to little effect. The enormously long line of supply back to Benghazi began to tell once more, and, on September 3rd, Rommel called off the attack.

Alexander and Montgomery, despite this considerable success, decided still to remain on the defensive until such time as they had been reinforced to a level of men and equipment that they knew could and would defeat their enemy. Shortly after the battle of Alam el Halfa, in the early part of September, President Roosevelt's gift of 300 Sherman tanks and 100 self-propelled guns began to arrive in Egypt, and the improvement in Allied sea and air power in the Mediterranean (British submarines were able to use Malta again from July) was ensuring an ever greater volume of supplies for the Allies. The reverse was, for the same reason, true for the Axis, and the German and Italian forces now experienced a considerable reduction in supplies of fuel and arms to reinforce the Panzerarmee Afrika .

Allied air power was built up impressively. The lessons of Hitler's Blitzkrieg had been well learnt, and long-range bombers became an important part of the tactical planning for the coming desert offensive. The crews of newly arrived American B-25 Mitchells and British Wellingtons began training in desert conditions, and a full-scale ground training programme initiated British crews into the mysteries of the Sherman tank.

Deception began once more to take a hand in the planning of the great Battle of Alamein, which was such a mighty undertaking that it was not to come until October's full moon. Montgomery made the assumption that Rommel would expect him to follow, as had previous commanders of the Eighth Army, the established British approach to tactical planning. Given that assumption, Montgomery reasoned, Rommel would expect him to attack from the South and try to drive the Axis forces into the sea, and to attack the armour first, expecting to mop up the German and Italian infantry later. The British plan was therefore based upon exactly the opposite procedure - an assault from the seabound North; a massive artillery barrage being followed by an infantry advance, the objective being to cut off the German armour, separate it from its supporting infantry and eliminate it piecemeal.

If Rommel was not to learn of this plan, the massive movements of British troops northward from the southern positions had to be concealed. Montgomery's mastermind of "Operation Bertram" was Major Charles Richardson, who hit upon the idea of replacing every vehicle that stole away in the night with an inflatable rubber replica, realistic enough to fool aerial reconnaissance and long distance observers. A fake pipeline was built, and was deliberately constructed slowly so that the Germans would believe the attack to be scheduled for November rather than October. False radio traffic was used to make the Axis listening posts believe that a third Armoured Division was in position to the South, between the Qattara Depression and Ruweisat Ridge. Camouflage assumed a new importance as the vast dumps of fuel and stores near the coast were concealed from prying Axis eyes.

Meanwhile the 7th Armoured Division and XXX Corps had new commanders - Major-General Harding and Lieutenant-General Sir Oliver Leese respectively - and a far tougher intensive training programme than they had previously experienced. A third Corps - X Corps - had been formed under Lieutenant-General Lumsden with the specific brief to pursue the enemy once the artillery and infantry had created a breach in the line. By mid-October, the Allies were ready. But what of Rommel?

He had in fact left the front because of poor health, and handed over command of Panzerarmee Afrika to General Georg Stumme, albeit with strict instructions to his successor to follow the agreed plan of campaign without undue display of initiative. The Axis had not been idle during the previous six weeks, and almost half a million German mines now lay between the Allied attackers and their enemy. The German and Italian Armoured Divisions had been withdrawn to the rear, and six divisions of infantry, including one Airborne, held the line. The 21st Panzer and the Italian "Ariete" Division were in the northern sector. The 15th Panzer and the "Littorio" Tank Division were stationed in the South.

The Greatest Bombardment in History

When Montgomery's surprise attack came at 9.40 in the evening of October 23rd 1942, the Axis were totally unprepared for its force, and had no inkling of the appointed date or hour. Rommel was still away from his Command, and two ofthe Italian commanders were on leave in Italy. A total of 592 Allied guns opened up simultaniously along a front from the Mediteranean to the Qattara Depression, the vast bulk of them - 456 - in the northern sector. For 15 minutes this enormous fire power hammered at the Axis positions, cutting communications, detonating many mines, disorientating the German and Italian defenders. As soon as the barrage ended, sappers with mine detectors- new devices at the time- and specially adapted tanks called 'Scorpians' with flails to detonate mines advanced into the minefields, with the infantry close behind. In the southern sector, General Horrocks' XIII Corps staged a successful but costly divertion which succeeded in its objective of preventing the 'Ariete' Division reinforcing the armour to the north.

Although the British divisions made considerable progress, they had by the 26th, when Rommel returned to his command, two days after his deputy Stumme had died of a heart attack in the field, failed to punch through to the the Axis' rear, as Montgomery's plan demanded. The British armour was therefore held up and relatively ineffectual, although infact the Axis forces had taken heavy losses, and had few tanks, widely dispersed. Rommel's first move was to concerntrate the armour and, as always, lead from the front, taking a powerful tank force to attack Montgomary's forward positions. But he reckoned without the formidably increased air power of Tedder's Desert Air Force, which now had a total of 1,200 aircraft, several times the available Luftwaffe resources.

The RAF bombers killed large numbers of troops and disabled tanks by the score, as did the new 6-pounder anti-tank gun that was newly arrived in north Africa. As Rommel fell back, the Allied armoured formations began to cut through their opponents' positions and fan out. By the 31st of October, Rommel was in a desperate position but was holding the line by bringing up his last reserves. There had in fact been a reduction in the ferocity of Mongomery's assault, and a withdrawal of Allied troops into reserve. This tactic reportedly caused Churchill much disquiet, and he had to be calmed by the ever-present Sir Alan Brooke. In fact, Mongomery was setting up th final assault that would set the Eigth Army on the road to Tunis - 'Operation Supercharge'.

On November 2nd, Major-General Freyberg's New Zealand Division led 'Supercharge' and encountered some of the closest in-fighting of the war - tank battles at ranges of only 20 and 30 yards were reported. Despite enormous Allied losses, the attack gradually wore down the Afrika Korps, which by November 3rd had only some 35 tanks left. On the 4th, the German line was breached, and X Corps almost wiped out the 'Ariete' division and captured General von Thoma, the commander of Afrika Korps.

The remains of Panzerarmee Afrika was now in full retreat westward, but much of the Italian infantry strength was surrounded and captured. The battle of Alamein was over. Montgomery and Tedder had shown that Rommel was not invincible, but the cost had been considerable. The Allies had lost 13,560 men, of whom 4,610 were killed or missing. The Axis had fared far worse - they had lost 25,000 killed and wounded, and 30,000 prisoners including nine generals.

Rommel was never again to hold the initiative or win a major victory in North Africa. His path to Tunis and defeat was clear. Despite orders from 'Commando Supremo' he made no attempt to stand and counter attack at El Aghelia. He had met his match.