OPERATION TORCH

THE U.S.A. STEPS INTO AFRICA

The invasion of French North Africa by an Allied force in November 1942 had as its objective the seizure of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, and the creation, with the British and Empire armies in the Western Desert, of a giant pincer within which to crush the Axis forces under Rommel. Militarily desirable as the operation was, it nonetheless had a firm basis in politics. This is not, however, to restate the old and inaccurate claim that Roosevelt set up Operation Torch to corner a greater Democratic vote in the 1944 Presidential election. The politics were of a higher order.

In January 1942, the so-called "Arcadia" conference between Churchill and Roosevelt, immediately following America's entry into the war, had confirmed the policy of "Germany First" that had been tacitly agreed long before the USA had been officially part of the conflict. As the Russians fought back after their appalling 1941 losses, Stalin put great pressure upon both Roosevelt and Churchill to open a second front against Germany - by which Stalin meant an invasion of France. Churchill knew that there was no way in which such an invasion could be possible before 1943 at the earliest, with or without the complicity of America, but there was substantial, and slightly naive, pressure from both public and military opinion in the USA for an invasion of the European mainland in 1942. Among the generals wanting to hit Germany where it hurt was Dwight D. Eisenhower. He and other generals outlined a proposal to build up US forces and arms in Britain - a plan which became known as "Bolero" - prior to a limited attack on France in 1943 to seize a bridghead in the area of Cherbourg. This latter operation was to be known as "Sledgehammer". This in turn was to be followed by a full scale invasion across the Channel, also in 1943, to be known as "Roundup".

Roosevelt doubted the short term practicality of this scheme, whatever its emotional desirability, since the USA had the potential for little more than three combat divisions ready for action in 1942. He therefore sent Harry Hopkins, his adviser and confidant, and General Marshall to London to discuss the whole issue with Churchill and his military staff. The outcome of this meeting was that "Bolero" was agreed for initial action, with Eisenhower as its commander, but the second front remained a matter of contention. Marshall wanted the "Sledgehammer" plan agreed as a means of reducing military pressure upon and political pressure from the USSR. Churchill wanted an operation in North Africa to provide evidence of political will to the USSR and evidence of active US involvement in the "European" war, without the peril of an invasion of Europe that was ill-prepared.

Eventually, following Churchill's visit to Washington in June, and a further visit by the American team to London in July, all prospect of a full-scale invasion of Europe being launched in 1942 was vetoed by Churchill, but it was agreed that the experimental "mini-invasion" at Dieppe, which had been in the detailed planning stage for months, should go ahead under the recently (November 1941) appointed Chief of Combined Operations, Rear-Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten. It was intended that this landing, which took place on August 19th 1942, should test on a small scale whether it was realistically possible to mount a cross-Channel invasion on the scale necessary to open the Second Front in Europe. In the event, the raid was a disaster, not least because the defending Germans were aware that it was coming. The Canadian 2nd Division lost 882 killed of the 4,963 men who took part, with 597 wounded. The British Commandos of Nos 3 and 4 Commando lost 275 killed, wounded or taken prisoner. But the raid nonetheless proved that a cross-Channel invasion was feasible, and pointed the way to the training and equipment requirements that needed to be met if the eventual invasion of France was to be successful.

However, to the Soviet leaders, operations like the Dieppe Raid were a sideshow, and to maintain credibility with the USSR "Operation Torch", the invasion of North Africa, was agreed upon. Because of French susceptibilities following the events of 1940, it was felt to be advisable that, although "Operation Torch" was to be demonstrably a joint Allied operation, with, in fact, more British troops than American, the actual invasion force should appear to be almost entirely American, and should have an American ground commander. This job fell to the colourful, aggressive and World War I experienced Major-General George C. Patton. As Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Eisenhower chose Major-General Mark Clark, who was to prove an able commander in his own right. The British troops, who were to land soon after the Americans, were to be commanded by Lieutenant-General Kenneth Anderson.

After much discussion based upon fears of Axis countermeasures from nearby Sicily, a plan for "Torch" was agreed upon which called for three separate US landings, two on the Mediterranean coast of North Africa, at Oran and near Algiers, and one on the Atlantic coast at Casablanca. Once the American landings were established, the British 1st Army was to go ashore at Algiers and, having established a bridgehead, turn East for an attack on Tunis. "Torch", at 60,000 men, was the largest combat force ever to have been shipped from the United States, and Norfolk, Virginia, its embarkation point, was absurdly stretched to cope. Training was at a frantic pace, command structures were fragile because of constant changes of personnel, and many of Patton's officers despaired of ever getting the force together as a cohesive whole.

In Britain, from where the Centre and Eastern Task forces were to begin their voyage, similar stresses prevailed and confusion reigned. The US Army had not attempted any feat of organisation quite so large before, and problems arising from inexperience and mismanagement were everywhere. Despite it all, the US 1st Armoured Division, and the 1st and 34th Infantry Divisions were embarked in Liverpool and Glasgow late in September and headed in convoy for the Straits of Gibraltar and the Mediterranean, traversing the Straits on the night of November 5th to 6th.

The Western Taskforce of the invasion, consisting of more than 100 ships, also managed to arrive off the coast of Morocco on schedule after a rendezvous at sea and an encounter with a U-Boat on the way across the Atlantic. On the night of November 7th 1942, the Western Taskforce split into three attack groups and, early in the morning of the 8th, went ashore by landing craft. Their initial objective was to capture the heavily defended city of Casablanca and its airport. The group given the airport landed at Mehdia, the others either side of the city at Safi and Fedala.

The Mehdia landing group under Major-General Lucien Truscott, which consisted of some 9,000 men from the 2nd Armoured and 9th Divisions, ran into heavy resistance from the Vichy French defending forces, and having had reinforcements delayed by French shelling of the fleet, was in a decidedly tricky position by the evening of the 8th. The arrival of reinforcements from the fleet on the 9th enabled them to fight on and capture the airport on the 10th, but not before 79 Americans had been killed and many more injured.

At Safi, to the South of Casablanca, Major-General Ernest Harmon, commander of the 2nd Armoured Division took 6,500 men of the 2nd Armoured and 9th Divisions ashore, again encountering tough opposition, and established the necessary beach-head. On the 9th November, Harmon's force encountered a French infantry force at Bou Guedra, and the resulting battle held up their advance until the next day when he was once again able to advance towards Casablanca. Harmon took Mazagan on the morning of the 11th and was on the road to Casablanca when he, like the other commanders, heard news of a ceasefire arranged with the complicity of Admiral Darlan, second in command to Marshal Petain in Vichy France, who was coincidentally in North Africa when the invasion took place.

The northernmost landing group of the Western Taskforce landed against similarly stiff opposition at Fedala under Major-General Jonathan Anderson, who had the largest force of the three - 16,500 men, mainly of General Anderson's own 3rd Division. They had almost reached Casablanca, and were about to turn their artillery loose on the city when news of the ceasefire reached them.

The Centre Taskforce, whose objective was the capture of Oran in Algeria, was the only one of the three taskforces to be able to claim a concluded military victory. The 22,000 men of the force attacked at several points, the 1st Infantry Division being allotted the task of encircling the city from East and West, and the 1st Armoured the job of pushing inland to come back upon the city from the South. Initial resistance was weaker than expected because the attack came as an almost total surprise to the defenders, but November 9th brought heavy fighting. On the 10th a US armoured thrust penetrated the city, and the French authorities surrendered at midday. The fighting in Oran cost the American force some 600 killed or wounded.

By far the most crucial job fell to the Eastern Taskforce, whose assault was upon Algiers, the centre of all French government in North Africa and the jumping-off point for the planned assault on Tunis. Landings on both sides of the city by three separate parts of the taskforce met comparatively little resistance - the westernmost landing party at Castiglione found that the local French defenders claimed to have been ordered not to resist at all. Only a small assault group of 650 Americans, plus some British officers in American uniforms, ran into heavy resistance when they atempted a frontal assault on the harbour at Algiers, a bold venture that enabled them to capture their initial objectives only to be forced to surrender when their position became hopeless.

In the afternoon of the 8th, Admiral Darlan recognised that the French position was hopeless, and that he had a choice between surrender without further bloodshed and defeat with a great deal of bloodletting on both sides. After consultations by radio with Petain, Darlan and General Juin agreed to a ceasefire inAlgiers, but not, at this stage, elsewhere in North Africa. On the 9th November, General Mark Clark arrived in Algiers to negotiate a ceasefire for the whole of French North Africa, and agreement was reached late the following day.

Meanwhile, General Anderson's British 1st Army was on its way over rocky roads to Tunisia, almost 400 miles to the East. Prompted by the Allied invasion, German and Italian troops were already arriving at Bizerta and Tunis by sea and air to secure Tunisia and the rear of Panzerarmee Afrika , and the French forces between the newly arrived Germans and the advancing Allies lacked the orders or the clear moral guidance that was necessary if they were to resist the Axis landings - quite simply, they were not sure for whom they were supposed to be fighting. Thus the German and Italian invaders rapidly established defensive positions in Tunisia, which were contained by French troops from mid-November once the French had clear guidance as to which side they were on. Although Anderson made contact with his enemy on November 20th, the momentum had gone, the Axis forces were too strong to be shifted quickly, and no amount of reinforcements and fighting could alter the position of stalemate. On Christmas Eve, as Darlan was assassinated by a young French monarchist, Eisenhower had reluctantly to abandon the idea of a swift capture of Tunis and Bizerta. Roughly 110,000 troops had taken part in "Torch" which, as improvisations go, was outstandingly successful, and laid the ground for the final defeat of the Axis in North Africa.

Although American soldiers had experienced battle in the "Torch" landings, they had yet to discover just how tough a foe the Germans could be. The bitter experience of the Battle of Kasserine Pass in 1943 would teach them that. Thus far, the US land forces had fought only the Vichy French army, whose loyalties were in any case divided, and who had been relatively easily overcome. The US Navy and the British Royal Navy had, however, not had quite such an easy time off North Africa.

The Vichy French Navy had joined battle in earnest with the escort vessels of the US taskforces, and had sustained heavy losses, including the cruiser Primauguet , 10 destroyers and 13 submarines. At Casablanca, the USS Massachusetts fought a brisk battle with the still incomplete French battleship Jean Bart and was fired upon from the shore. Attempts to send British naval sloops into Algiers harbour early in the battle for the French seat of North African government had resulted in the Walney , the Hartland and the Broke being lost, and the Malcolm making a hair's breadth escape.

Nonetheless, the overall picture was one of Allied success, not only in the objective of strategically occupying French North Africa, but also in its being the first large-scale Allied combined operation, and the first major Allied amphibious invasion. It was the taste of things to come.