THE FINAL PUSH IN BURMA

THE END OF JAPANESE DOMINATION

The Burma war had, since May 1942, when the British Army had been driven out of Burma, been remote both from the European War, which it resembled so little as to be almost incomprehensible to the soldiers fighting in Europe, and from the American war against Japan, nearer at hand but totally different in character. The Japanese, having captured Burma and the road to Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist China, were content to stay on the defensive. The successive British and Allied commanders felt on the one hand an obligation and a duty to attack, and on the other a sense of the futility of repeated offensives and counteroffensives that achieved little and could be predicted to do little more than cost lives.

The frustration of Churchill and the Allied political leaders with the moving stalemate of Burma had been echoed in repeated changes in command at all levels. These had culminated, after the Allies' disastrous performance during 1942 and 1943 in the Arakan coastal region of North-West Burma, in the total restructuring of the Allied command. General Wavell had, in 1943, become Viceroy of India, General Sir Claude Auchinleck had become Commander-in-Chief in India, and Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten had been appointed Allied Supreme Commander, South-East Asia Command, based in Ceylon (now Sri Lanka). An 11th Army Group commanded by General Sir George Giffard had included a new 14th Army commanded by Lieutenant-General (as he then was) William Slim.

The new organisation had prospered, and the structure of the military organisation in India and Burma was overhauled from top to bottom. When the third Arakan offensive had been launched after the monsoon at the end of 1943, it had been a much tougher and better equipped Allied army that advanced down the Mayu peninsula to the heavily-fortified Maungdaw-Buthidaung line to join battle with the Japanese at the beginning of 1944. The Japanese 55th Division under Lieutenant-General Hanaya had attacked the strung-out Allied army by their well-tried techniques of jungle infiltration and outflanking movements, mainly as a diversionary tactic to draw as much Allied strength as possible into the Arakan, and away from the other side of Burma. For it was there, the Japanese High Command had decided, that their main strategy for 1944 was to be concentrated in an attack west across the Chindwin hills towards Imphal.

The so-called "Ha-Go " offensive by the Japanese had lasted three weeks in February 1944 before General Hanaya, recognising that XV Corps intended to hold out indefinitely, called it off as a battle he could not win. For the first time in the Burma war, the British and Commonwealth army had used air support, proved by the Chindits to be an effective and practical supply system, to maintain a full-scale siege and eliminate the need to withdraw in the face of attack. General Slim's new Army had shown that the Japanese were not, after all, invincible. As for Hanaya, although he had lost the battle, he had achieved his greater objective. One Japanese division had succeeded in tying down more than six Allied divisions while the parallel "U-Go" offensive against the British stronghold at Imphal was mounted. The new administrative and organisational structure of the 14th Army had, however, been shown to be the hinge of successful defence; now it was to become the thin end of the wedge of victory.

The Japanese attack on Imphal began in earnest on March 8th 1944, forestalling the Allies' own intended advance to the Chindwin River. Lieutenant-General Yanagida's 33rd Japanese division crossed the Chindwin and advanced against the British IV Corps under General Scoones. Rather than attempt to fight the Japanese on their own ground, in the jungles through which they had proved themselves the superior soldiers, Slim instructed Scoones to withdraw to the plain, and bring the Japanese out into the open terrain in which they were least effective. In doing this, the Allied commanders knew that if the Japanese succeeded in cutting the road to the railhead at Dimapur, the defenders of Imphal would be totally dependent on supply from the air. The Japanese in fact intended not only to cut the road but also to capture the railway, and thereby to block the supply route by which Chiang Kai-shek's arms and supplies reached General Stilwell's air force, which in turn ferried them "over the hump" to China.

The Japanese commanders now made the same mistake, born of over-confidence nurtured by years of success, that they had made in the recent Arakan campaign. They gambled on the availability of the supplies at Imphal to feed their own army. They thus made an assumption of rapid victory that was not to be justified in the event. By the end of March 1944, the Japanese had succeeded in cutting the road to Dimapur, and were advancing on to the plain of Imphal from three sides. Allied air power now began to tell in purely military terms, as the 5th Indian Division was flown into Imphal from the Arakan, and the 7th Indian Division was brought by air to Dimapur.

Meanwhile, to the North, the parallel Japanese attack against the town of Kohima, which was the key to a pass to the Assam Valley, had been stemmed by the defenders. They were a lean, hungry, small but determined force made up of a battalion of the Royal West Kent Regiment, a Nepalese battalion, a battalion of the Assam Rifles and every walking wounded and convalescent from the military hospital capable of firing a rifle. On April 4th, the Japanese 31st Division attacked viciously, driving them into an even tighter perimeter, and eventually on to one hill. There, supported by bombing attacks from Allied aircraft, they held on tenaciously and stubbornly, supplied entirely from the air and denying the Japanese army passage through the pass to Assam, until they were relieved on April 20th.

Even after the relief of Kohima by the 161st Indian Brigade, there were still 60,000 British and Indian troops encircled at Imphal requiring all their supplies and food and ammunition to be dropped from the air. Mountbatten was desperately short of transport aircraft, and clung firmly to twenty American aircraft that he had "borrowed" from Stilwell's "Hump" air force, and had neglected to return, despite every encouragement from the Americans to do so. But to supply Imphal effectively, and starve the Japanese army into retreat, he needed seventy more transport aircraft quickly. Appeals to the Americans for yet more aircraft were unsuccessful - perhaps they suspected they might not get those back either - and it eventually fell to Churchill to pull strings and deprive Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander of seventy of his transport aircraft from the Mediterranean.

As May ended and June began, the siege of Imphal continued unremittingly. The Japanese overall commander in the Sector, Lieutenant-General Mutaguchi, secure in a distant hill station, instructed the commanders of his 15th and 33rd Japanese Divisions to fight on and not under any circumstances to retreat. In fact, the Japanese divisions were now desperately short of food and equipment, as a result of the Chindits having cut their supply lines, and were attacking fanatically as their strength ebbed. General Scoones, commanding IV Corps in the defence of Imphal, had been ordered to break out, but the effort of maintaining his line against suicide attacks aimed at capturing his food supplies was tying down a substantial part of the Corps. By the third week of June, the Monsoon was in full spate, the Japanese had lost ground and were being squeezed by the British 2nd Division coming from Kohima, and it seemed that the end of the battle was in sight. But the monsoon conditions effectively prevented Allied air power from dominating the battle. Not until June 22nd did the British 2nd Division and the Indian 5th Division meet and open the road to Imphal. With some justification, Lord Louis Mountbatten predicted that the first major British victory in Burma was in sight.

General Slim ordered IV Corps and the divisions that had lifted the siege to pursue the two Japanese divisions, who, despite their privations - the 33rd were in far less difficulty with disease and starvation than the 15th Division - were fighting grimly on the roads to the South. But Allied air superiority, the increasing ravages of the monsoon and the devastation wrought by disease completed the Japanese defeat. Of the 88,000 Japanese soldiers who had crossed the Irawaddy to begin the attack, over 53,000 were dead, sick or wounded. Allied casualties at Imphal and Kohima totalled 16,700.

The victory at Imphal began the advance by Lieutenant-General Slim's 14th Army back to the Chindwin, which was crossed in December 1944. At the same time, the British 36th Division, a part of General Stilwell's Northern Combat Area Command, had fought its way South down the railway from Mogaung and was, at the turn of the year only 100 miles North of Mandalay. The 36th Division played a major role in limiting the options of the Japanese 15th Army by turning its flank as the 14th Army advanced. Now the final push to victory in Burma could begin.

The Road to Mandalay

As the 19th Indian Division made the 14th Army's first crossing of the Chindwin River early in December 1944, Lieutenant-General Slim, who had planned a campaign West of the Chindwin to eliminate the expected Japanese resistance in that area, suddenly found he had to revise his plans. Major-General Rees' 19th Indian Division made contact so quickly with the British 36th Division from the Northern Combat Area Command that it was apparent the Japanese had little intention of making a major stand East of the Chindwin river. Slim therefore decided to push for Mandalay, East of the Irawaddy, the great river that flows South to the strategically vital port of Rangoon, and which stood between the 14th Army and the regaining of Lashio and the Burma Road.

General Stopford's XXXIII Corps was to push as two columns from Kalewa via Yeu to the Irawaddy North of Mandalay, and via Monywa to the South of the city. The 19th Indian Division, already East of the river well North of Mandalay, would advance down the East bank to the objective, and IV Corps under Lieutenant-General Messervy would cross the Irawaddy well South-West of the city and strike East to take Meiktila, the most important road, rail and communications centre of the region. The advance went well. As February began, Stopford's XXXIII Corps was across the Irawaddy, and two weeks later IV Corps was in position for its Southern crossing. While the 14th Army was pushing forward, Commando units captured the island of Akyab and Ramree to provide sites for airfields necessary if the armies were to be supplied from the air in sufficient quantity.

To the North, General Stilwell's 140,000 troops of the Northern Combat Area Command were advancing southwards against stiff opposition from Lieutenant-General Honda's Japanese 33rd Army. On the Burmese coast, General Christison's XV Corps was fighting the Japanese 28th Army for an opportunity to get through the An and Taungup passes and hammer the Japanese communications to the rear of the army facing the other fronts. But for the Japanese Army's jungle experience and training, their position would have been precarious in the extreme. As it was, they were outnumbered, unable to call up any reserves, and constantly threatened by massive Allied air superiority.

As General Stopford's 20th Division of XXXIII Corps crossed the Irawaddy, the Japanese counterattacked in force on February 12th, and although the division established a bridge-head, the battle raged for two weeks before the 20th could break out and continue the advance. During that time, the 2nd Division also crossed, some miles further North, and had a similarly difficult time, but between the two of them the 20th and the 2nd Divisions kept the much-depleted 15th Army busy while General Messervy's 7th Division crossed with only limited resistance on its way to take Meiktila. By February 20th, Messervy's IV Corps had consolidated its bridge-head sufficiently to make its move towards the target, 80 miles away. By the end of February, Major-General Cowan's 17th Division of IV Corps had reached Meiktila, and on March 1st, without wasting any time, they attacked. By March 3rd, Cowan had both the town and the airfield, which was absolutely vital for the Allied airborne supply operation. Despite many Japanese counter-attacks, Major-General Cowan, reinforced with an extra brigade, not only held on to Meiktila, but also launched a number of successful local forays that mopped up Japanese opposition.

While all this was happening in Meiktila, Stopford's divisions were advancing on Mandalay, and although the 19th Division ran into stiff opposition around Mandalay Hill, and the 2nd Division found the old town of Ava more difficult to take than expected, Slim found that overall the defence of Mandalay was lighter than had been anticipated. So he ordered a column of the 20th Division to bypass Mandalay and head South to Meiktila, and gave the 2nd Division the job of capturing the city. By March 20th Mandalay had fallen, and the Allies at last knew they were beating the Japanese at their own game.

In the North, General Stilwell's troops had been similarly successful, and had taken Hsenwi on March 1st, and the vital target of Lashio on March 6th. On March 24th, the Burma Road from Lashio to Mandalay was once again open to Allied traffic. The success of the campaign for Mandalay and Lashio was the swansong of the Northern Combat Area Command. On March 19th it was disbanded, and its Chinese divisions returned to the liberation of China's rice-growing areas from the Japanese.

The 14th Army had, since crossing the Irawaddy, lost some 10,600 killed, wounded and missing in the fighting. But they had gained a considerable prize. Now all eyes turned on Rangoon, the great port to the South.

The Sweep to Rangoon - and the End of the War in Burma

The 14th Army had come a long way since Imphal. But Rangoon was a long hard fight ahead of them at the end of March 1945. One of the earliest and bloodiest actions of the campaign had come at Kangaw, two months earlier, while the campaign for Mandalay was in its early stages. Holding the An and Taungup passes, Lieutenant-General Miyazaki and his 54th Division sent a covering force to delay the advancing 81st and 82nd West African Divisions for as long as possible, and set about establishing full-scale defensive positions in two crucial areas. The principal defence was in the region of Kangaw, 40 miles East of Akyab, and only 10 miles East of the Myebon peninsula. The secondary force was in the town of Taungup. Since January 1945, the Allied navies had been in total control once more of the Bay of Bengal, and furthermore Akyab itself had been recaptured. It was decided that the 3rd Commando Brigade would take Myebon with an amphibious landing, and open the way for the 74th Brigade to advance inland and cut the Japanese division's communications at Kangaw.

On January 12th, 42 Commando, Royal Marines, went ashore in style on the beaches of Myebon, closely followed by 5 Commando, who were supposed to be there, and by 1 and 44 Commandos who were supposed to be on quite a different beach but landed anyway. The next day, Myebon itself was taken, and by the 17th the whole peninsula was in Allied hands. The 74th Brigade set out for Kangaw, and the Commandos were withdrawn for their assault role. The plan at Kangaw was for the Commando Brigade to seize a bridge-head on the East bank of the River Diangbon Chaung two miles South-West of the town of Kangaw, and for the 51st Brigade to go through the bridgehead and join up with the 74th after their march overland from Myebon. This would hem the Japanese force in on three sides. But surprise was vital.

On January 21st, a Royal Navy force of 50 assorted ships and craft anchored off the mouth of the Diangbon Chaung and bombarded the beaches, while aircraft of the RAF bombed Japanese positions. The Japanese did not see the attack coming, and were thrown completely off balance. Over two days, first 5 Commando, then Nos. 42 and 44 Royal Marine Commandos went ashore and established positions under heavy fire. The Japanese fought back fiercely, bombarding the invaders with artillery and repelling attempts to take Kangaw. On the 26th January, the 51st and 53rd Brigades landed, bringing tanks to reinforce the Commandos.

General Miyazaki responded by bringing up his own reinforcements in the shape of three infantry battalions and an artillery battalion under Major-General Koga. On January 31st, they attacked the Commando positions with everything they could muster, and for almost two days a fierce battle continued without respite, and without the Japanese taking the British positions. By the time the 74th Brigade arrived, the Commandos had killed more than 300 Japanese, had lost 66 killed and 259 wounded, and had won a posthumous Victoria Cross - that of Lieutenant Knowland of No. 1 Commando. By mid February, the Japanese had withdrawn to the An pass, and Kangaw was won - a vital step in the campaign that began one month later to capture Rangoon.

Since November 1944, the 11th Army Group had been disbanded, and Lieutenant-General Slim and the 14th Army came under Lieutenant-General Sir Oliver Leese, in his new role as Commander, Allied Land Forces, South-East Asia. After the capture of Mandalay on March 20th, Mountbatten and Leese were anxious to complete the clearance of Japanese forces in Burma by advancing to Rangoon before the monsoon. General Slim was therefore instructed to drive southwards, again as a two-corps thrust. General Stopford's XXXIII Corps was to move down the Irawaddy valley to Prome and on to Rangoon; General Messervy and IV Corps were to follow the road through Pyabwe, Pyinmana, Toungoo and Pegu. The two Corps would, it was decided, move from airfield to airfield, being resupplied at each as it was captured. More than 3,000 local fighters, the Karens, were organised as a defence force in the Hills to protect the flanks of the advancing Corps, which each had 350 miles to advance before reaching their goal.

The advance went smoothly, with only occasional serious hold-ups due to determined Japanese resistance. General Stopford captured Chauk on April 18th; Magwe and Yenangyaung on April 21st. His Corps reached Prome on May 3rd. General Messervy and IV Corps took Pyinmana on April 19th, Toungoo on the 22nd and Pegu on May 1st. Messervy was now only 50 miles from Rangoon.

Meanwhile, Mountbatten, alarmed at the imminence of the rains of the monsoon, and its potential for delaying the end of the war in Burma, had decided to go ahead with an amphibious invasion of Rangoon. On april 27th, two naval forces set sail to support the operation. One, consisting of two battleships (one of them the French Richelieu ), four cruisers and two escort carriers, bombarded targets in the Nicobar and Andaman Islands to prevent intervention from Japanese forces based on them. The other was made up of three destroyers and succeeded in sinking most of a small Japanese convoy carrying reinforcements and stores. Early in the morning of May 1st, a battalion of the 50th Gurkha Parachute Brigade was dropped at Elephant Point, where they overcame a small force of Japanese defenders, and cleared the way for landing craft to come up the river to Rangoon itself. During that day, an RAF Mosquito twin-engined fighter-bomber, flying over Rangoon jail, saw the immortal words "Japs gone. Extract digit" painted on the roof. Knowing that only those with a sound grasp of RAF slang could have painted such words, the pilot, Wing-Commander Saunders, landed at a nearby airfield, which was deserted, made contact with the prisoners, and then, because his aircraft had been damaged while landing, took to the river in a motor boat to alert the landing troops that the Japanese had left. As he did so, the 26th Division came up the river and took the city.

Thus was the victory in Burma finally won. To be sure, there were many small engagements between May and August, mainly in the appalling conditions of an unusually severe monsoon flood, but organised resistance by the Japanese had been broken, and they held no further major strategic Burmese locations. Lieutenant-General Slim, promoted full General, became Commander Allied Land Forces South-East Asia in succession to Leese, and, his reputation made, was set for a distinguished postwar career.

Only the final assault on the Japanese islands, and on Japan itself remained before the Second World War would finally be concluded.